The world was stunned on Feb. 27, when just a few short days after the end of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia, Russian forces operating out of military bases located on Ukraine’s strategic Crimean Peninsula seized control of the territory – effectively severing it from Kiev’s control.
As a result, for the first time in many decades the prospect of great-power military conflict in Europe has once again raised its ugly head.
Ostensibly intended to protect the interests of the peninsula’s pro-Moscow, Russian-speaking majority, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s use of troops is widely interpreted as a reaction to the pro-Western revolution that ousted Ukrainian President — and Putin client — Viktor Yanukovych from office in Kiev.
While violence has so far been avoided, Russia, which has long-standing ties to Crimea and much of the rest of Eastern Ukraine, has nonetheless demanded that Ukrainian units stationed in Crimea surrender or face “a military storm,” as the Russian admiral issuing the ultimatum put it.
More worrisome, though, is that it is unclear whether Moscow has aims on Ukrainian territory beyond the besieged Crimean Peninsula. There is a distinct possibility that Putin could expand the invasion by seizing all of Eastern Ukraine. In response, the shaky new pro-Western government in Kiev has called up its military reserves and, as a result, the world could soon be faced with the prospect of an actual shooting war between Ukraine and Russia.
The West, collectively horrified by Putin’s actions, is dithering. Though NATO intervention in support of Ukraine is not yet on the table, relations between the West and Moscow look set to sink to their lowest levels since the height of the Cold War.
To say that what has happened in Crimea is a disaster for European peace and security is an understatement. At the very least, the European Union has been reminded that their authoritarian, highly nationalistic and heavily armed neighbor to the east remains a threat to their immensely wealthy political bloc. At worst, it could remilitarize great-power European diplomacy in a way that hasn’t been seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. What’s potentially even worse, however, is the effect a relaunch of Russo-Western geopolitical conflict may have on the rest of the world.
In the Middle East, for instance, the West will likely find Syria a very opportune place to retaliate for what Russia has done in Ukraine. Bashar al-Assad, already under pressure by a hodge-podge of rebel groups that have seized control large parts of the country, will no doubt soon face a rebellion reinvigorated by a flood of Western money and weapons all aimed at making Russia pay for its naked aggression against Ukraine. Such an outcome would only make the situation in Syria – already a terrible bloodbath – a much more violent, dangerous conflict.
The Middle East
Indeed, Russia has already asked Saudi Arabia not to provide advanced weapons, such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, to the Syrian opposition. The introduction of such weapons would do much to devastate Assad’s military advantage over the rebels and could directly lead to Assad’s fall by eliminating his command of the air and ability to use his armored forces. Or it could otherwise force Moscow to greatly up the amount of assistance it is providing to its embattled client in Damascus.
Insofar as Washington has some influence to dissuade Riyadh from providing those weapons to the Syrian opposition, any incentive the Obama administration might have had to actually use it is now gone, having been trod under by Russian infantry in Crimea. In fact, the U.S. could now see itself as justified in shipping large amounts of military aid to the anti-Assad opposition to such a degree that Assad’s fall would be all but assured. Think, for a moment, what that could mean.
Assad, for instance, still has access to chemical weapons. Currently, those weapons are scheduled to be destroyed under the agreement struck between Washington and Moscow in September of last year. There is no reason to think, however, that if pushed to the wall by rebel groups intent on hanging him from the nearest lamppost, Assad will not use those weapons still in his control against his enemies or that Russia would prevent him from doing so. Not only would this lead to horrific numbers of people killed in the most awful of ways, it would also force the hand of the United States and its allies to intervene militarily – either in response to a chemical weapons attack or as a preemptive strike to forestall the use of such weapons if their preparation has been detected.
At the very least, we can expect a huge increase in violence in Syria and the renewed possibility of overt U.S. military intervention into the Syrian civil war. Either way, Assad is likely doomed, meaning Russia’s and Iran’s principal ally in the region will be replaced by a pro-Western, Saudi satrap. What then? Moscow and Tehran, it would seem, would have a new reason to work together, making it much less likely the West and Iran could strike a mutually agreeable nuclear deal.
If the talks fail and the Iranian program continues, would that not lead directly to an Israeli strike on Iran? Or a U.S. strike? Would Russia not lend Iran, which is far stronger than Syria, diplomatic assistance and military aid? In such a situation, would not Iraq, already riven by a renewed Sunni insurgency that has targeted Iraqi Shiites, become even more split and prompt both Saudi Arabia and Iran to intervene in order to support their respective coreligionists and political allies? Imagine the bloody fighting now contained in Syria moved east and centered on Baghdad instead of Damascus.
East Asia
Finally, consider what happens in East Asia, where a rising China has clashed with its neighbors over competing maritime territorial claims in the South China and East China seas.
Content to be an arms merchant to everyone involved, Russia has not become terribly involved in these disputes. News out of Beijing, however, is that China could be subtly moving to support Russia in its Crimean adventure. China has effectively cast blame for the situation on the West’s unwise meddling in Ukraine’s internal affairs. While it calls for both the West and Russia to come to an agreement that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it has not condemned Russia’s use of troops.
Support from Beijing on Crimea could, in turn, lead to Moscow aiding China’s bid to reorder East Asian territorial claims to its own benefit. Russia, it should be remembered, is a Pacific power that has a substantial naval presence in the Pacific and a land border with both China and North Korea. Each could be used to aid China and its Korean client in any conflict with the U.S. or its East Asian allies.
Russian support would also provide China with a huge ‘rear area’ full of strategic economic resources such as oil, minerals and agricultural land that might otherwise be threatened by the U.S. Navy should the balloon go up in the Pacific – which, in turn, would make China much less likely to compromise in the future and thus make military conflict between China and the U.S. and its allies more likely.
All this doesn’t even touch upon how renewed conflict between Moscow and the West would influence Latin America, where a virulently anti-American Venezuela and Cuba would find a ready ally in Putin’s Russia.
Another question is how this conflict might affect global energy markets, considering Russia is a major energy exporter and provides Germany – the economic linchpin of the European Union – with up to 30 percent of its natural gas. How will the economic turmoil created by this crisis and a renewal of prolonged hostility between Moscow and the West play out in the weeks, months and years ahead?
Clearly, the fallout from the crisis in Crimea and the Ukraine will be widespread and will contaminate huge areas of global economic and political life that have been relatively insulated from the harsh world geopolitics so far.
It’s been decades since the world was convulsed in such a way by the prospect of armed conflict between the world’s major powers, and we’ve grown comfortable in the idea that geopolitical conflict of this sort has been relegated to the history books. History, however, looks to be making a comeback, and there doesn’t yet seem to be a surefire way for stopping it.